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Abstract. modal ontological arguments are often claimed to be immune to the 
«perfect island» objection of Gaunilo, because necessary existence does not 
apply to material, contingent things. but Gaunilo’s strategy can be reformulated: 
we can speak of non-contingent beings, like quasi-Gods or evil God. The paper is 
intended to show that we can construct ontological arguments for the existence 
of such beings, and that those arguments are equally plausible as theistic modal 
argument. This result does not show that this argument is fallacious, but it shows 
that it is dialectically ineffective as an argument for theism.
I. ClAssICAl AND moDAl oNToloGICAl ArGumeNTs
In Proslogion II, Anselm of Canterbury presented his well-known 
ontological argument for the existence of God. God is by definition the 
being than which no greater can be conceived. If we suppose that such 
a being does not exist, then we could imagine something greater, namely, 
an existent God, but that is impossible since there can be nothing greater 
than God. so we may conclude that God exists.
This reasoning came under instant criticism: the monk Gaunilo objected 
to Anselm’s proof, claiming that it is fallacious, because we could use it to 
establish false, or at least extremely implausible consequences, like the 
existence of a perfect island. For if we define Atlantis as an island that is so 
great that no greater island can be conceived, and if we suppose that Atlantis 
does not exist, then we can imagine something greater than Atlantis – 
namely, an existent Atlantis; but it is impossible, since there can be nothing 
greater than Atlantis. Therefore, we should conclude that Atlantis exists.
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Anselm tried to respond to Gaunilo’s arguments, but his response is 
quite disappointing. Anselm simply assumes that God is the only being 
to which an ontological argument may correctly apply, and does little 
to support this claim. I do not say that Anselm couldn’t formulate any 
arguments for it, but as a matter of fact, he did not formulate them.
As we know, history likes to repeat itself, and virtually the same 
situation was repeated five hundred years later. Descartes in his 
Meditations on First Philosophy presents the following argument: 
God is, by definition, the being having all perfections. but existence 
is a  perfection, therefore, God exists. Meditations drew considerable 
critical attention from prominent intellectuals of that time, one of which 
was Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi objected to the Cartesian argument with 
an example of the perfect Pegasus: the concept of this being, among other 
perfections, contains existence, therefore we should be able to establish 
the existence of the perfect Pegasus, which is absurd. Descartes’ reply to 
Gassendi was crude and rhetorical, mainly due to a negative personal 
attitude. so again the argument intended to parallel the ontological 
argument was neglected and treated as silly.
such “parallel” arguments were neglected probably even more, when 
objections to the ontological proofs formulated by Hume and Kant were 
considered by many philosophers as most important and decisive: the 
Humean thesis that “necessary existence” is an  inconsistent concept, 
and the Kantian dicta that existence is not a (real) predicate and that no 
existential statement can be analytically true.
This situation continued until the middle of the twentieth century. 
It was at this time when some philosophers – most notably Charles 
Hartshorne and Norman malcolm – insisted that the real intention of 
proponents of ontological proofs, especially Anselm, was to provide 
a  modal proof; that is, a  proof of the necessary existence of God, not 
just existence simpliciter. Anselm’s Proslogion III contains just such 
an overlooked argument: God is the being than which no greater can be 
conceived, and if we conceive that God does not exist, we could conceive 
some greater being – a being which cannot even be conceived not to exist, 
but it is in contradiction with the definition of God. so God exists and 
cannot even be conceived not to exist.1 Not only did Hartshorne and 
1 From the purely textual point of view, Anselm’s main argument is non-modal, while 
the modal one looks like a mere corollary, which may explain why the discussion focused 
on the non-modal argument. Interestingly, a similar situation is in the case of Descartes: 
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malcolm interpret Anselm in a novel way, but they also proposed their 
own modal arguments based on their interpretation of Anselm. With 
their work, modal form was established as a standard for contemporary 
ontological arguments, like those of Kurt Gödel and Alvin Plantinga.
The main hope of adherents of modal ontological arguments is the 
alleged ability of those arguments to avoid the main criticisms levelled 
against classical, non-modal proofs. Firstly, Kant’s objection that existence 
is not a predicate may be dismissed by observing that although existence 
is not a predicate of anything, necessary existence is a genuine predicate, 
because it expresses the certain mode of existence of a  certain thing. 
secondly, a  new light is thrown upon the rejection of the “explosivist” 
arguments of Gaunilo and Gassendi. Although Anselm and Descartes 
gave very unclear and unconvincing answers to those arguments, we can 
now see what probably was the intuition lying behind those answers: 
examples of the greatest conceivable island or perfect Pegasus do not 
constitute sound objections to modal ontological proofs, because the 
notion of necessary existence does not apply to material things, bounded 
in space and time and causally dependent in their existence on other 
things. “Necessary existing island” and “necessary existing Pegasus” are 
simply inconsistent concepts, so we do not have to bother with them. 
malcolm, for example, says that a necessary being must exist timelessly,2 
and islands and horses are clearly not timeless beings. (It should be noted, 
however, that an appeal to timelessness is not necessary. Hartshorne, for 
example, as a process theist holds that God is a temporal and changing 
being. Hartshorne’s reason to reject arguments with islands and horses is 
the contingency of those beings.3)
Those observations seem to support the view that modal ontological 
arguments are immune to classical criticisms and therefore may 
constitute sound proofs of the existence of God. but are they immune 
to any criticism? Certainly not, as even proponents of modal ontological 
arguments differ in views on the correct formulation of the argument; for 
example, Plantinga rejects the arguments of Hartshorne and malcolm 
the argument from Meditations is clearly a non-modal one (existence is a perfection), 
while in responses to Objections Descartes shifts to a modal form (necessary existence, 
which is an exclusively divine attribute, is a perfection).
2 Norman malcolm, ‘Anselm’s ontological Arguments’, The Philosophical Review, 
69 (1960), 48.
3 Charles Hartshorne, Anselm’s Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof 
for God’s Existence (la salle: open Court, 1991), p. 19.
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as insufficient.4 What is more, there is even a  controversy over which 
attributes should be counted as perfections: most theists (“classical” 
ones) hold that eternality and immutability are perfections, but 
Hartshorne disagrees with them on this point. Naturally, modal proofs 
also come under attack by philosophers suspicious about any ontological 
arguments and philosophers opposed to any forms of proofs of God’s 
existence. one possibility of a  global criticism of modal ontological 
arguments is to insist on the Humean idea that the concept of necessary 
existence is incoherent or meaningless, but in recent years this view 
seems to be losing popularity due to widespread use of possible worlds 
semantics and the idea of transworld identity: a  necessary existing 
object (like mathematical objects for example) is an object which exists 
in every possible world. We can also dispute some modal axioms used 
in the proofs, like axiom s5, i. e. discuss whether this axiom in the 
metaphysical interpretation (if something is possibly necessary, then it is 
necessary) is true or not, but it is a difficult issue. so those objections are 
far from conclusive. It may seem that we are stuck in an impasse: neither 
party gains a decisive advantage over the other. Are there any prospects 
of breaking this impasse? I think that there are. 
II. “eXPlosIVIsT” ArGumeNTs moDIFIeD
I believe we can find a global objection to modal ontological arguments 
by utilizing Gaunilo’s and Gassendi’s idea and modifying it so that 
it becomes immune to critics’ objections. Critics say that necessary 
existence does not apply to islands, horses and so on, because they are 
contingent, temporal beings. so what about considering some non-
contingent, non-temporal beings? Firstly, consider quasi-Gods, that is, 
beings which possess all perfections except some of them, for example 
a quasi-God which is omniscient, omnibenevolent and not omnipotent, 
but only very powerful. secondly, consider the Evil God, that is, the being 
which is exactly alike God in every respect except of being maximally 
evil (omnimalevolent).5 The concepts of such beings cannot be dismissed 
4 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 212-213.
5 It should be noted that this line of argument is not entirely new, for among critics 
of ontological arguments one can find various appeals to “anti-gods” or “devils”. For 
example, Jan Woleński (Jan Woleński, ‘Gaunilon dzisiaj’, in Dowody ontologiczne. W 900. 
rocznicę śmierci św. Anzelma, ed. stanisław Wszołek [Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 
2011], p. 33) makes use of the concept mirroring Anselms’ definition of God: the being 
than which no worse can be conceived. However, it is not specified what attributes this 
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out of hand as inconsistent with the property of necessary existence, so 
they are genuine counterexamples which should be taken into serious 
consideration by anyone who thinks that he or she is in a possession of 
a sound ontological argument. To avoid any misunderstandings, I want to 
stress that evil God is not the same thing as Devil or satan, because Devil 
is not conceived as omnipotent and omniscient, but only as powerful 
and very informed. This is very important, because belief in the existence 
of Devil is inherent in many theistic conceptions, so many theists could 
be pretty happy should this belief be proved. on the contrary: if we could 
prove the existence of evil God – not Devil – along with the existence 
of God, then we would fall into some sort of manicheism, which is 
unacceptable for most theists. I shall return to this issue later.
so far, we have the concepts of quasi-Gods and of the evil God. Now, 
we can launch any of the modal ontological arguments to “prove” that 
those beings necessarily exist. since it would take a  lot of time to test 
all modal ontological arguments, we may choose one example to see 
the core idea: the reasoning goes on in an  analogous way in the case 
of other arguments. let’s utilize one of the arguments from malcolm – 
it is probably the simplest one and is not engaged in any complicated 
formalism. The standard argument for God goes as follows:
(Premise 1) God is an eternal, and therefore noncontingent being, so 
it either exists necessarily, or its existence is impossible.
(Premise 2) God is not impossible.
(Conclusion) Therefore, God exists necessarily.
The argument for evil God is exactly parallel:
(Premise 1*) evil God is an  eternal, and therefore noncontingent 
being, so it either exists necessarily, or its existence is impossible.
(Premise 2*) evil God is not impossible.
(Conclusion*) Therefore, evil God exists necessarily.
of course we can substitute evil God with any quasi-God we please and obtain 
an analogous conclusion. surely such results are unwelcome to the utmost for 
many people. What then can be objected to this (and similar) argument?
being possesses, and Woleński seems to conceive this being as a  being which simply 
possesses attributes which are opposite to all of God’s attributes. but such being wouldn’t 
be the worse conceivable being – for example, an  omnimalevolent being which lacks 
omniscience is certainly per saldo less evil than an  omnimalevolent being which is 
omniscient. In fact, the being than which no worse can be conceived – evil God – differs 
with God only with respect to goodness.
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III. obJeCTIoNs To moDIFIeD GAuNIlo-TYPe ArGumeNTs
“Cooked Up” Concepts
It is sometimes claimed that the concepts of quasi-Gods, nearly perfect 
beings and so on are “cooked up”; that is, they are arbitrary concepts 
made up ad hoc by philosophers, in contrast with the concept of God, 
which is fairly natural. This objection could possibly be employed by 
malcolm, who does not intend to prove the possibility of God and finds it 
sufficient to observe that the concept of God, like the concept of material 
thing, has “a  place in the thinking and the lives of human beings”.6 
Although malcolm, a  pupil of Wittgenstein, does not say it explicitly, 
he is probably making use of the concept of a language game: theism is 
a certain language game of many people, which somehow substantiates 
the view that the concept of God is consistent. Perhaps he would be 
tempted to say that the concepts of pseudo-Gods are not anchored in 
this way, so they are ad hoc. but malcolm says that “I do not think that it 
is legitimate to demand such a demonstration [of the consistency of the 
concept of God]”,7 so we could similarly reject any demand of proving 
the consistency of concepts of pseudo-Gods.
Another problem with malcolm’s remark is that if we treat the 
appeal to a theistic language game really seriously, then we could argue 
not only that God is possible, but that He is real, since He plays such 
an  enormous role in the thinking and the lives of so many human 
beings. And this strategy would remove the very need for an ontological 
argument for God’s existence. since such a  “linguistic argument” for 
God’s existence looks implausible, the appeal to language games in 
establishing the consistency of theism also seems unconvincing. maybe 
malcolm wouldn’t deny this consequence, but if so, he would be unable 
to formulate a  convincing linguistic argument for the inconsistency of 
pseudo-Gods. Without deciding whether this interpretation of malcolm 
is sound or not, we can say that this line of argument is amiss. Firstly, 
the concept of evil God is not so arbitrary, because it has some grounds 
in the religious life of humanity, like that of manicheists and maltheists. 
secondly, and more importantly, it is completely irrelevant whether 
concepts are natural or not, cooked up or not. even the most cooked 
6 Norman malcolm, ‘Anselm’s ontological Arguments’, The Philosophical Review, 
69 (1960), 59-60.
7 Ibid., p. 60.
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up concepts have some objective features, and maybe it is an objective 
feature of those cooked up concepts of gods that ontological arguments 
really apply to them. Consider the following concept:
(C) the number identical with 2,73 + log4 1913 – sin(cos 1,14 – log189 tan 1,12)
It is a completely cooked up concept! but this is irrelevant, because this 
concept has some objective features, like being a concept of a rational 
number (if this number is in fact rational) or being a  concept of 
an irrational number (if this number is in fact irrational). Therefore it 
is not important whether, for example, the concept of a being which is 
omniscient, omnibenevolent and capable only of conjuring falls of golden 
coins is natural, because one of the objective features of this concept may 
be the applicability of the ontological argument. besides, the naturality 
of concepts is, naturally, an extremely vague property.
Rival Gods
Another objection goes as follows: it is impossible that there are two 
or more omnipotent beings, because they would limit each other’s 
omnipotence. This is probably true, but it only shows that by using 
ontological arguments we may fall into contradictions, so there is 
another reason to give up those arguments. If somebody would insist 
on saying that God exists, therefore evil God cannot exist, we could 
easily turn it and say that someone could insist on saying that evil God 
exists, therefore God cannot exist. but someone could retort that God is 
more perfect, and therefore more powerful than evil God, so God has 
some kind of metaphysical priority. such argument lays on a confusion 
regarding the notion of perfection. This notion is ambiguous, or maybe it 
has even more meanings. Perfection in the neutral sense is any property 
that makes some being powerful, while perfection in the axiological sense 
is any property which makes some being axiologically positive. In the 
natural language, both those notions figure under the word “perfection”. 
For example, omnibenevolence is surely a perfection in the axiological 
sense, but not in the neutral sense, because benevolence has nothing 
to do with power. on the other hand, omnipotence, omniscience and 
necessary existence are perfections in the neutral sense, but not in the 
axiological sense, because power and knowledge may be used for very 
different purposes, not only for good ones, but also for evil ones. evil 
God differs from God only with respect to goodness, and this is not 
a perfection in the neutral sense. God and evil God are equally powerful, 
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since both are omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily existing, etc., so there 
is no reason to think that God, as more perfect, has any priority over evil 
God in the competition for existence. The ambiguity of the notion of 
perfection has another interesting consequence: it shows that the concept 
of the being possessing all perfections – God – is not as homogenous as 
it may seem at first glance. It seems homogenous when we treat it as 
a concept of a being possessing all properties of some given, natural kind 
(in this case, that kind is “[maximal] perfection”). but once we realize 
that “perfection” is ambiguous, we see that the concept of a supremely 
perfect being is in fact “pasted” of two completely different concepts: the 
concept of a being supremely perfect in the neutral sense and the concept 
of a  being supremely perfect in the axiological sense. The concept of 
God is therefore not a homogenous one, because it contains properties 
which do not form a single, natural kind, and the opposite impression 
is due to the use of an ambiguous word “perfection”. of course, the lack 
of homogeneity is not a drawback for a concept, similarly as the lack of 
naturality, discussed before. but it is not wholly without importance in 
the case of God and ontological arguments. I suppose that the apparent 
homogeneity of the concept of God has some intuitive, aesthetical, 
or even mystical value for a theist: this concept looks so simple, uniform 
and elegant that it may prompt to consider it as something which is not 
a mere figment of our imagination, but a representation of some ultimate, 
simple, unsurpassable, divine metaphysical reality. such intuitions may 
favour the acceptance of ontological arguments and its premises among 
some theists. but after the recognition of the essential heterogeneity of 
the concept of God, those intuitions may fade away, which may in effect 
increase skepticism about the correctness of ontological arguments.
Inconsistency
The third and, in my opinion, the most important objection that can be 
raised is that quasi-Gods and evil God are impossible. In the premise 2* 
we assume that evil God is not impossible, but maybe we are wrong and 
this premise is false?8 Here we enter into a tricky issue, which I will try 
to deal with carefully and show why this objection is wrong. let’s start 
8 This is the premise of a “parody” of malcolm’ argument, but exactly the same premise 
will be crucial in the “parodies” of the arguments of Hartshorne, Gödel and Plantinga. 
(I  put the word “parody” in quotation marks, because those parallel arguments are 
intended to be serious objections, not jokes.)
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with a question, what reasons can somebody have to claim that a certain 
being is impossible? of course, that reason is a proof of the impossibility: 
for example, we can prove that the combination of being omnipotent, 
omnibenevolent and knowing only geometry is plainly inconsistent, 
because an  omnibenevolent being will use its infinite power to gain 
knowledge about the world to spread goodness and fight evil in the 
most effective way.9 but, on the other hand, the combination of being 
omnipotent, omniscient and not being omnibenevolent does not seem 
inconsistent, because, as I already said, infinite power and knowledge may 
be used for many different purposes, also for evil ones, including greatest 
possible evil. Probably we cannot prove that this concept is consistent, 
but the proponents of modal ontological arguments have the very same 
problem: they cannot prove that the concept of God is consistent, they 
simply assume it as an additional axiom in their deductions. so, since 
they cannot show that God is possible, they are in no position to claim 
that (for example) evil God is impossible, unless they deliver an explicit 
proof of its impossibility. Is there any such proof?
some theists support the following argument: evil God is impossible, 
because as an  omniscient being, it is also morally omniscient, and 
therefore is unable to perform any evil acts. What shall we say about 
this objection? some people may be tempted to reject it on meta-ethical 
grounds: there is no such thing as moral knowledge, because sentences 
expressing moral valuations do not have any truth-value, so (by classical 
definition of knowledge as justified true belief) they cannot be an object 
of knowledge. but this objection, involving an  acceptance of meta-
ethical antirealism, noncognitivism and/or emotivism, is not the one 
I would support: firstly, I  am committed to meta-ethical intuitionism; 
secondly (and more importantly, since my personal views are irrelevant 
in this matter), this argument is ineffective, because moral anti-realism is 
controversial in itself, there are no decisive arguments supporting it. so it 
would again put us in a philosophical impasse.
However there is a  much simpler and better argument against the 
incompatibility of omniscience with omnimalevolence. For the sake 
9 Although somebody could insist that any talk of “gaining” (implying change) 
is inappropriate in the case of eternal beings, we may neglect this problem, because 
analogous problems arise with respect to God itself: we could argue that God, as eternal 
and immutable being, cannot act, cannot know anything, cannot be conscious, cannot 
love, cannot hate, cannot judge, etc., and this would pose a very serious challenge for the 
consistency of theism itself.
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of the argument let’s assume the existence of genuine moral knowledge. 
Now, the possession of moral omniscience by some subject does not 
imply that this subject will act in accordance with this knowledge. by 
rejecting this view we would fall into ethical intellectualism, which is very 
implausible. on its basis it seems unlikely to explain the phenomenon of 
weak will, when a subject knows that he or she shouldn’t act in a certain 
way, but cannot help himself or herself, for example due to extreme lust. 
Another phenomenon unlikely to be explained by intellectualism is 
bad will itself: it seems that an ethical intellectualist should eventually 
endorse a view that all subjects are essentially good, but some of them 
(like Devil) are handicapped by a  lack of moral knowledge. It would 
seem that even the most loathsome villain acts with a good will. some 
subjects create objective evil and harm, but only because they do not 
know it to be so: should they realize it, they would cease doing this. It is 
not only counter-intuitive, but also morally dubious, for it would seem 
that condemnation and persecution of villains is equally unjustified as 
condemnation and persecution of children for their inability to solve 
differential equations. And if someone would retort that a villain is guilty 
of not acquiring appropriate moral knowledge, we will fall into a vicious 
regress, because we could say that he or she did not know that he or she 
should acquire any moral knowledge.
Those consequences of ethical intellectualism are even more 
destructive for the religious perspective: we should come to the conclusion 
that Devil – the alleged symbol of ultimate evil and corruption – is 
a confused, but noble mutineer, who hates God and rebelled against him, 
because God wrongly seems to him to be an evil tyrant and oppressor. 
someone could object that phenomena of weak and bad will occur only 
in the case of finite and temporal beings, like humans (or even angels), 
not in the case of eternal beings. but the plausibility of the very attribution 
of such a human and temporal thing as will to eternal beings is pretty 
dubious, so if a theist accepts such an attribution, then there seems to 
be no reason to think why this will cannot be weak or bad. If we accept 
the possibility of infinitely good will, then acceptance of the possibility 
of infinitely bad will would be equally justified. What’s more, it seems 
that moral omniscience is not only compatible with omnimalevolence, 
but it is also a necessary condition of the latter. For if a subject is not in 
a possession of moral omniscience, then it is possible that some of its 
evil actions are merely accidentally evil; the lack of moral omniscience 
may be at least a partial excuse for those actions, and the existence of 
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such excuses makes omnimalevolence impossible: omnimalevolence 
excludes every possible excuse. A subject which performs all evil actions 
on purpose is worse than a  subject which performs some of its evil 
actions unintentionally. Infinite and unsurpassable evil is possible only 
if some subject is in possession of complete and well-established moral 
knowledge and in all possible circumstances intends to act contrary to 
what it knows to be good and decent.
Another argument for the impossibility of evil God employed by some 
theists goes on in the following way: the concept of evil God contains one 
imperfection (omnimalevolence) among all other perfections (except 
omnibenevolence), so this imperfection is something like a “black hole” 
in the plenitude of perfections. but perfections cannot exist separately: 
if we have some collection of perfections, we cannot simply add to them 
any property we please. such a grave imperfection as omnimalevolence 
cannot exist in such a  perfect surrounding, composed of so many 
perfections: it just doesn’t fit them, they are metaphysically opposite and 
cannot coexist. but why should we agree with that? From an argument 
for the impossibility of evil God we would normally expect to find 
something showing a reason why a certain property with some specific 
content is incompatible with some other properties with their specific 
contents, like in the case of the alleged incompatibility of omniscience 
with omnimalevolence. but here one is not appealing to the specific 
content of properties, only to some abstract features of those properties, 
like “being a perfection” and “being an imperfection” and some pretty 
vague and unclear intuitions of general incompatibility of perfections 
and imperfections.
To substantiate those intuitions, some theists appeal to certain 
ancient metaphysical doctrines, like the mediaeval doctrine of 
transcendentals, which identifies being, Good, beauty and Truth (and 
some other properties, like unity) and has some antecedents in the 
Greek, especially Platonic, thought. but such an argument is endangered 
by circularity: the transcendental identification of being with Good and 
beauty is due to the assumption that every being is a creation of God, 
and everything which good God creates must be good and beautiful. The 
doctrine of transcendentals presupposes the existence of God, so using 
this doctrine to defend ontological arguments for the existence of God 
would beg the question. The claim that it is metaphysically impossible 
for an imperfection to exist among the plenitude of perfections slightly 
reminds of a “metaphysical” argument against the existence of sunspots, 
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discovered by Galileo: Aristotelian opponents of the astronomer were 
a priori demonstrating that there can be no dark places on sun, since 
sun and light, by virtue of their “nature”, exclude any darkness. In our 
case, sun is the plenitude of perfections (except omnibenevolence) and 
sunspot is the imperfection of omnimalevolence. some explanation 
for the intuitions of the incompatibility of omnimalevolence with the 
plenitude of almost all perfections may be the ambiguity of the notion 
of perfection, pointed to in earlier discussion. When we conceive 
“perfection” unambiguously, then we may be tempted to feel that the 
imperfection of omnimalevolence is somehow out of place in the 
plenitude of all perfections (except omnibenevolence). but after we 
realize the ambiguity, this impression should disappear.
out of the popularly discussed divine attributes, the only perfection 
in the axiological sense is omnibenevolence,10 while all other attributes 
(like omnipotence, omniscience, necessary existence, etc.) are perfections 
in the neutral sense. so, when we subtract omnibenevolence from the 
set of all other perfections, we arrive at a  concept containing purely 
neutral perfections, and since omnimalevolence is imperfection in the 
axiological sense, then there is no reason to suppose why it should be 
incompatible with them, since omnimalevolence and other properties 
are (im)perfections with respect to very different criteria. The impression 
of incompatibility was caused by overlooking the ambiguity.
Probably more arguments for the inconsistency of the concept of evil 
God could be formulated. but, as we saw it in the case of two examples 
of such arguments, probably they would eventually be as inconclusive as 
well-known atheistic arguments that the concept of God is inconsistent, 
like the paradox of stone against omnipotence or the claim that 
omnipotence is inconsistent with omniscience. What I  am trying to 
show is a relative consistency proof for the concept of evil God. relative 
consistency proofs are known from mathematical logic: for example, we 
cannot prove that Peano arithmetic is consistent, but we can prove that 
Peano arithmetic is consistent if Heyting arithmetic is consistent.
A  slightly similar situation occurs here: we cannot prove that evil 
God is possible, but if someone believes – without a proof – that God is 
possible, then he or she is in no position to say that evil God is impossible, 
unless an  explicit proof of impossibility is delivered. somebody could 
10 one could also add infinite justice, infinite love, etc., but I think that those attributes 
can be treated as immanent parts of omnibenevolence.
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object that certain people, most notably leibniz and Gödel, presented 
proofs of the consistency of the concept of God, so this concept has 
an advantage over the other ones. Those proofs are highly disputable, but 
this is not a proper place to go into any details. Apart from that, any proof 
of the consistency of the concept of God does not show that the concepts 
of quasi-Gods and evil God are inconsistent. If we don’t have proofs 
for the inconsistency of the concept of quasi-Gods and evil God, then 
we have no reason to claim that those concepts are inconsistent, when 
there is no prima facie inconsistency in them. many people, including 
many theists, claim that it is legitimate to assume the possibility of 
something as long as there is no explicit proof of its impossibility. This 
principle is sometimes used by supporters of ontological arguments to 
establish rational acceptability of the premise “God is possible”. but this 
stick has two ends: we may use the same principle to establish rational 
acceptability of the analogous premises of possibility of the existence of 
quasi-Gods and evil God.
IV. CoNClusIoNs
Considerations about the inconsistency objection seem to show that 
eventually there is an epistemic equilibrium between modal ontological 
arguments for the existence of God and the existence of quasi-Gods 
and evil God, and that adherents of the proofs for God cannot escape 
the acceptability of the proofs for pseudo-Gods on the grounds of their 
theories. but what does that conclusion really mean? Firstly, it has not 
been shown that the joint acceptance of the existence of these deities 
is inconsistent or false, and secondly, it has not been shown that modal 
ontological arguments for the existence of God contain any fallacies, 
whether formal or material. but, I hope, it has been shown that modal 
ontological arguments are, in a sense, incompatible with (mono)theism, 
the view that there is only one deity – God, because a theist, using modal 
ontological arguments, is unable to block undesired instances of those 
arguments, which prove the existence of other deities.
This result does not show that modal ontological arguments are 
fallacious, but it shows that almost all of their proponents (who are theists) 
cannot use such arguments, because it would lead to inconsistency 
within their views. such a result may seem very weak and unsatisfactory: 
it may seem that to refute the ontological arguments is to show where 
and why they are wrong. but if it really is the case that ontological 
126 DANIel CHlAsTAWA
arguments are theistically unacceptable, it is a  most important result, 
because it allows us to finish the discussion about ontological arguments 
and herald a  victory for the opponents of those arguments. What is 
more, their supporters (assuming that the arguments outlined here shall 
convince them) will give up ontological arguments and help the others 
find where and why they are wrong. recognition of the incompatibility 
of ontological arguments with (mono)theism is the first step in this 
inquiry, but it is sufficient to establish the generally negative attitude to 
ontological arguments.
Although this result is partial, it is much more beneficial than 
criticisms which aim at precise identification of fallacies of ontological 
arguments, but pay a  high price for it: they are highly inconclusive, 
and therefore unable to establish an effective, general argument against 
ontological arguments. It is hard to decide whether modal ontological 
arguments are sound or not, but if my considerations are correct, then 
ontological arguments are useless in the role of establishing theistic 
beliefs – a role which those arguments were intended to play by almost 
all of its proponents.
If some manicheists, maltheists or even polytheists would happily 
employ ontological arguments to prove the existence of the multitude of 
deities they believe in, it could be not an easy task to show that they are 
wrong. We cannot show that modal ontological arguments are invalid 
or unsound, but we can show that they are dialectically ineffective, not 
merely by pointing to the obvious empirical fact that people usually 
aren’t very impressed by them. And this is a sufficient reason to reject 
those arguments.
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